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The writer is an Israeli pollster and journalist
本文作者是一名以色列人、民调专家兼记者
In recent months, two decades-old conflicts — between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Azerbaijan and Armenia — have taken tentative but significant steps towards peace. The breakthroughs have restored hope that conflicts can end through diplomacy, not only by butchery. By contrast, and despite vastly greater global attention, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is further from peace than ever. Resolving it will require fresh ideas from outside.
近几个月来，两场延续了数十年的冲突——卢旺达与刚果民主共和国之间，以及阿塞拜疆与亚美尼亚之间——都在朝着和平迈出谨慎但重要的一步。这些突破重燃了人们的希望：冲突可以通过外交手段解决，而不只是靠屠杀。与之形成鲜明对比的是，尽管获得了更广泛的全球关注，以色列-巴勒斯坦冲突距离和平却比以往任何时候都更遥远。要解决这一问题，将需要来自外部的新思路。
There is a different example of time-tested diplomacy that has saved lives. Thirty years ago, the leaders of Bosnia, Yugoslavia and Croatia signed the accords negotiated under US auspices in Dayton, Ohio, and ended the war in Bosnia — one of the bloodiest ethnonationalist wars of the last century. For three decades, Bosnia has avoided a resurgence of ethnic violence, proving that despite cynicism, agreements can halt bloodshed. But the applicable lessons from the Dayton accords for Israelis and Palestinians go much further.
还有一个久经考验的外交实例曾挽救了无数生命。三十年前，波斯尼亚、南斯拉夫和克罗地亚领导人在美国主导下于俄亥俄州代顿签署了协议，结束了波黑战争——这是上个世纪最血腥的民族主义战争之一。此后三十年，波斯尼亚避免了族群暴力的死灰复燃，证明尽管世人多有愤世嫉俗，但协议确实能够阻止流血。然而，代顿协议对以色列人和巴勒斯坦人的适用经验远不止于此。
Bosnia might seem like a troubled comparison. The country is beset by difficulties related to the original conflict, and to the Dayton framework. The agreement split Bosnia into two constituent entities, one under the control of Bosnian Serbs, which some saw as a reward for violence, while the other entity is the “federation” of Croats in Bosnia and Bosniak Muslims. Dayton’s constitution requires representation of the three main groups, Bosniak Muslims, Croats and Bosnian Serbs, in the country’s complex shared governing institutions. This has led to venal governance and embittered citizens.
波斯尼亚或许看起来并不是一个恰当的对照。该国至今仍深陷源自最初冲突以及代顿框架本身的困境。协议将波斯尼亚划分为两个组成实体，其中一部分由波黑塞族控制，一些人认为这是对暴力的奖赏；另一部分则是由波黑克族与波斯尼亚克族穆斯林组成的“联邦”。代顿宪法要求三大主要族群——波斯尼亚克族穆斯林、波黑克族人和波黑塞族人——在这个国家复杂的共治机构中都必须拥有代表。这种安排导致了腐败治理，也让民众日益愤懑。
Many criticise the system for discriminating against other minorities, and for being prone to ethnic exploitation. The Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik continues to traffic in ultranationalist secessionist policies, and has recently been convicted for violating the terms of the agreement. Serbia and Croatia are a negative influence and Bosnia’s EU path has been beleaguered and slow. The aim is not to copy Bosnia’s fate, but to extract essential principles from the Dayton framework that can help Israelis and Palestinians find a path out of hell.
许多人批评这一体制歧视其他少数族群，并容易被族群政治所利用。波黑塞族领导人米洛拉德•多迪克(Milorad Dodik)继续兜售极端民族主义的分离主义政策，最近还因违反协议条款而被定罪。塞尔维亚和克罗地亚带来了负面影响，波斯尼亚的欧盟进程也举步维艰、缓慢不前。目标并不是复制波斯尼亚的命运，而是从代顿框架中提炼出一些基本原则，帮助以色列人和巴勒斯坦人找到走出炼狱的道路。
One such lesson is obvious. The architect of Dayton, the late US diplomat Richard Holbrooke called his book To End a War, not To Reach a Temporary, Partial Ceasefire. Critics later developed the idea that Dayton was intended to be temporary, but the first line of the accord reads: “Recognizing the need for a comprehensive settlement to bring an end to the tragic conflict in the region.”
其中一个教训显而易见。代顿协议的设计者、已故的美国外交官理查德•霍尔布鲁克(Richard Holbrooke)将其著作命名为《结束一场战争》(To End a War)，而不是《达成一份暂时的、部分的停火协议》(To Reach a Temporary, Partial Ceasefire)。批评者后来提出，代顿本意只是暂时性的安排，但协议的第一句话写道：“鉴于有必要达成一项全面和解，以结束该地区的悲剧性冲突。”
Yet in the Israeli-Palestinian case, it has become normal for over a decade to invest almost all diplomatic efforts in temporary ceasefires, without ending the conflict. If the Gaza war ends with a ceasefire alone, the chance of resurgence is 100 per cent. The only way to end the war in Gaza is permanently, and the only way to do that is through comprehensive final status talks.
然而在以色列—巴勒斯坦问题上，十多年来几乎所有的外交努力都集中在临时停火上，而不是结束冲突。如果加沙战争仅以停火告终，那么冲突再度爆发的可能性是百分之百。结束加沙战争的唯一途径是永久性的解决，而做到这一点的唯一办法就是通过全面的最终地位谈判。
Second, outside intervention is critical. In Bosnia, it took Nato military strikes against Serbs before the Dayton negotiations could advance. That won’t happen in the Middle East but the two sides won’t settle matters themselves, and external powers must seek to impose an agreement. The intensive international role in implementing Dayton in Bosnia, and later Kosovo, was essential to making the deal work.
其次，外部干预至关重要。在波斯尼亚，只有在北约对塞族发动军事打击之后，代顿谈判才得以推进。这种情况不会在中东发生，但双方也不会自行解决问题，外部力量必须寻求强行促成一项协议。国际社会在执行波斯尼亚代顿协议以及后来在科索沃的密集介入，是确保协议发挥作用的关键。
Third, Bosnia’s peace agreement is grounded in a constitutional arrangement between warring ethnonational groups. Israeli-Palestinian peace would not need to have the same arrangement — Bosnia and Herzegovina remains a single country, while Israel and Palestine will almost definitely be two. But like in Bosnia, the warring groups could define a measure of separation and co-operation on issues such as economic policy, security and freedom of movement. If these measures sound fantastical in the Middle East, they were implemented in Bosnia, where the physical crimes were no less barbaric.
第三，波斯尼亚的和平协议建立在交战民族主义族群之间的一种宪制安排之上。以色列—巴勒斯坦和平不必采用同样的安排——波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那仍然是一个国家，而以色列和巴勒斯坦几乎可以肯定将是两个国家。但与波斯尼亚类似，交战各方仍可以就经济政策、安全以及人员自由流动等问题界定某种分隔与合作的机制。如果这些措施在中东听起来像是幻想，那么请注意，它们在波斯尼亚已经得到实施，而那里的暴行并不逊于中东。
One final lesson is to drop this presumption that “trust” is a condition for peace. My own polling leaves no doubt about the depth of mutual Israeli-Palestinian distrust. But how much did Bosnian Muslims or Croats trust Bosnian Serbs in 1995, after the siege of Sarajevo, systematic rape and genocidal killings? The ethnic groups in Bosnia are still lukewarm about one another. In 2023, a USAID-funded survey found that an average of just 43 per cent of all three ethnic groups trusted the other two groups. But they’re not killing each other. Seeking to build “trust” or “confidence” between Israelis and Palestinians without ending the war, occupation and conflict is a phantom goal and a waste of time. The only trust-building measure is to impose a full end to the conflict — now.
最后一个教训是，必须抛弃那种把“信任”视为和平前提的假设。我的调查毫无疑问地显示出以色列人和巴勒斯坦人之间深刻的互不信任。但在1995年，在萨拉热窝围困、系统性强奸和种族灭绝式屠杀之后，波斯尼亚克族人或波黑克族人又能有多少人信任波黑塞族人呢？如今波斯尼亚的各族群之间依然互相冷淡。2023年一项由美国国际开发署(USAID)资助的调查发现，三大族群平均只有43%的人信任另外两个族群。但他们没有再互相残杀。试图在不结束战争、占领和冲突的情况下去建立以色列人和巴勒斯坦人之间的“信任”或“互信”，不过是虚幻目标，纯属浪费时间。唯一的“信任建设”措施，就是立即强制结束冲突。