{"text":[[{"start":5.2,"text":"The writer is a former chair of Fifa’s Governance and Review Committee and now dean at Catolica Global School of Law"}],[{"start":12.14,"text":"Fifa, the private organisation that governs football, has become one of the most powerful institutions on the planet, wielding enormous clout while remaining subject to remarkably little scrutiny. The latest controversies to consume it are not isolated mis-steps. They are merely the latest symptoms of a governance model that has reached its limit."}],[{"start":32.64,"text":"Many observers are now hoping that the outrage over Fifa president Gianni Infantino’s abortive plan to carve out a $20bn commercial entity from the Swiss non-profit will lead to change. We have seen such hopes before — for example in the wake of the corruption scandals that erupted in 2015 — yet the institutional structures that produced those failures remained intact. If reform once again focuses only on personalities rather than institutions, history will repeat itself."}],[{"start":61.12,"text":"Infantino is not the problem. Rather, the central issue here is that Fifa is both the regulator of world football and its main commercial actor. In any other sector such an arrangement would be recognised as an obvious conflict of interest. Yet football has normalised it."}],[{"start":77.76,"text":"Once commercial success becomes the primary measure of institutional success, all other objectives — which, as custodian of the game, Fifa is supposed to protect — are eventually subordinated to revenue growth. The health of players gives way to an ever more congested calendar. Competitive balance is sacrificed in pursuit of global television audiences. Supporters increasingly become consumers to be monetised, rather than communities to be served. Fifa making commercial success the measure of a World Cup’s success is the equivalent of a government claiming its national health service is the best because it is very profitable, while most of its citizens no longer have access to high-quality medical care."}],[{"start":116.2,"text":"Fifa’s governance model provides strong incentives towards this prioritisation of profits. Its financial resources support a system of patronage that entrenches incumbents and discourages dissent. Replacing one “imperial” president without changing those incentives merely prepares the ground for another."}],[{"start":133.4,"text":"That patronage system is facilitated by the small and closed electoral pool that decides on the presidency. Confederations and national associations replicate the same governance flaws as Fifa. They are dominated by a relatively stable pool of incumbents and the successors those incumbents often choose for themselves. Women are severely under-represented, while fans and other stakeholders have little voice. Football governing bodies claim a bottom-up legitimacy, but operate from the top down."}],[{"start":166.16,"text":"Nor do meaningful checks and balances exist. Independent committees cannot remain independent if appointments, mandates and removals ultimately depend upon the very holders of power they are meant to scrutinise. Rules alone do not produce accountability. They require institutions capable of enforcing them without fear or favour. Without these, you have rules without the rule of law. My own experience serving briefly within Fifa’s governance structures confirmed how fragile such independence can be when it becomes inconvenient."}],[{"start":198.8,"text":"The solution is simple: Fifa’s regulatory functions should be separated from its commercial activities. Its governance should become genuinely inclusive and representative, giving meaningful voice to players, supporters, women and other stakeholders. Oversight must be genuinely independent, protected by transparent appointment procedures and secure mandates free from conflicts of interest."}],[{"start":222.66,"text":"These are basic principles of good governance. The remarkable fact is not that they are being proposed but that they have never been fully applied."}],[{"start":230.84,"text":"Fifa’s power structures make it impossible for any essential reform to happen from within. As in 2016, a change of leadership may be used to stymie urgently needed governance changes."}],[{"start":243.2,"text":"Political authorities have responsibilities here that they can no longer avoid. The Court of Justice of the EU has repeatedly warned that having a sports governing body exercising regulatory authority over a market in which it is the dominant commercial actor raises serious legal risks. In its 2007 white paper on sport, the European Commission cited a study showing that sport accounts for 3.7 per cent of EU GDP and 5.4 per cent of its labour force. It thus represents a major sector of the European economy."}],[{"start":274.92,"text":"European institutions have historically deferred to sporting bodies’ claims of autonomy. That deference can no longer be justified."}],[{"start":282.6,"text":""}]],"url":"https://audio.ftcn.net.cn/album/a_1785830381_2842.mp3"}